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In the light of the dramatic political events in Europe and the United States, from the election of Donald Trump to Brexit and the surging of the National Front as a leading political party in France (and other far right actors across Europe more generally), voices far and varied talk of the marginalization and diminution of postnationalism, and the reassertion of national sovereignties (Fonte and O’Sullivan, 2016). It is striking that the very core of the forces of transnational politics and gl̶obal capitalism  ̶  the United States and the European Union  ̶ is the location where the current economic and political crisis has been unleashed. That is to say, the crisis is not just economic, but impacts political and social assumptions about an emerging global order.
The nationalist backlash is targeting precisely the dimensions highlighted in the argument on postnational citizenship, namely the state’s increasing accountability to human rights norms (notably for non-citizens); the concomitantly growing role of the judiciary and quasi-judicial bodies and the role of human rights in the framing of, inter alia, migration and refugee policy. The structural tensions, in the wake of the growing importance of human rights and the associated “judicialization,” were pointed out in the postnational argument itself from the 1990s (Jacobson, 1996; Jacobson and Ruffer, 2003). Some claim, however, that postnationalism is now “dead” and perhaps was illusory to begin with (e.g., Nodia, 2017). 
However, such a perspective is problematic because of its linear (and counter-linear) depiction of social change and its narrow understanding of citizenship as a concept and practice​[1]​. In particular, much discussion regarding postnationalism, since the debate emerged in the 1990s, has been focused on citizenship in the way membership of the nation-state is determined. But the development of postnational citizenship has been multifaceted  ̶  in the way institutions have evolved, in the growing emergence of the “politics of rights” (as opposed to the “politics of consent”), on the vertical as well as horizontal judicialization of not just political but social life, and in the rapid expansion of transnational civil, social and economic activities.


1.	Postnational citizenship: an argument’s seeds

The most recent key debate on citizenship and its political-sociological underpinning started in the mid-1990s (Soysal, 1995; Jacobson, 1996; Sassen, 1996; see also Balibar, 2003). Postnationalism provided a framework in which the basis of domestic state legitimacy justification could be re-oriented from the long-institutionalized notions of “sovereignty” to one that had more subtle interplays between state autonomy and responsibilities under international human rights. Under this argument, even the basis of the international order itself was shifting, where state (and non-governmental organization) intervention in other states was increasingly legitimized under transnational human rights codes (consider the intervention justification in the former Yugoslavia civil war). Perhaps postnationalism was also reflecting a period of optimism with the end of the Cold War and an emerging transnational order where human rights would play a key role, building on the global core of states and regional institutions in the Euro-Atlantic arena.
Debates regarding the postnational citizenship argument have spurred over two decades of empirical research, still ongoing, especially in Europe. Critics have tended to assume that postnational citizenship necessarily leads to, or is associated with, multiculturalism (e.g., Joppke, 1999; Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Bloemraad, 2006). However, as a legal framework, human rights can sanction a variety of political systems from multicultural Britain to republican France. What is key, in terms of human rights as an international legal instrument, are individual rights and volition. Ironically, human rights in certain respects limits multiculturalism. States have to in principle abide by international human rights law on, say, freedom of conscience  ̶  and so does a father in being required to respect his daughter’s right not to marry the man of her father’s choosing. In this regard, cultural practices are indeed changed. While multiculturalism is sanctioned and even promoted under human rights norms, this is only insofar the cultural expression is voluntary of the individuals concerned. This is evident in judicial decisions, from the European Court of Human Rights to national courts in democracies (Jacobson, 2009).
But key across arguments on postnationalism, pro and con, is the role of post-World War II migration. Though postnational scholars varied in their arguments on a number of dimensions they generally shared a view that, mutatis mutandis, structural shifts led to the emergence of larger foreign populations in Western Europe and in the United States. This was driven by transnational migration (defined as migration that bypassed the prototypical model of states determining who could enter and who could become a citizen  ̶  for example, undocumented migration and “guest worker” programs that failed to repatriate the workers), which itself was a response to, inter alia, economic needs in the “host” countries. States responded to those populations, who had to be legally accounted for, with the gradual, ad hoc expansion of their rights.
Furthermore, transnational human rights codes, which are rooted in personhood rather than citizenship per se, were a ready mechanism to account for populations who straddled the insider-outsider dichotomy so key to citizenship, and were leading to a devaluation of citizenship as it had been traditionally understood. The rate at which states turned to human rights varied: ironically states like Germany, whose citizenship regime rested in a blood-based Volks Gemeinschaft turned to human rights more readily as their notion of citizenship at the time simply did not countenance non-ethnic Germans. The United States and France, on the other hand, who defined citizenship in more political terms (rather than ethnic) found ways to absorb such populations through “stretching” constitutional or domestic law to account for resident non-citizens​[2]​. But even in those cases the role of human rights grew, even if the United States and France in this re̶̶gard lagged behind, to some degree, Germany. And notions of singular citizenship (in banning dual citizenship) and blood descent-based citizenship rather quickly declined in these regions, under the impact of this postnational shift (Jacobson, 1996).
It is important to take note of an essential aspect associated with this growing role of human rights and a more postnational perspective of state membership: the “judicialization” of politics. The judiciary has played not only an essential role in this transformation  ̶  rights get mediated through judicial mechanisms  ̶ but there has been a broader growth in judicial politics: more laws, more specialization of law, more courts, courts increasingly drawing on international law, and judicialization within private and public organizations, for example in areas such as adjudicating race or sexual discrimination (Jacobson, 1996; Jacobson and Ruffer, 2003). 
Various individuals and non-government groups have quickly adapted to this process, appealing to human rights for their claims, either formally in courts or in popular discourse. Human rights also facilitated a change from the idea of the nation as a monocultural body to a more diverse image of society. This may account for why, for many scholars, multiculturalism came to be viewed as synonymous with postnational citizenship. In fact, as we noted previously, postnational citizenship (and, more broadly, judicial practice regarding human rights law), has a more nuanced relationship to multiculturalism (Jacobson, 2009)​[3]​.
As a function of the postnational turn, we witnessed a partial but significant shift from the “politics of consent” to the “politics of rights.” Human rights can become the alternative scaffold to build state legitimacy and political life. However, as we observe in both Europe and the United States today, fissures erupt as well. When politics do shift to judicial and administrative bodies, questions of a democratic deficit arise, as in the European Union (see Steffek et al., 2008). This creates an impetus for democratic protest and a protest for democracy  ̶  but also for populist movements that can be dangerous to civic politics, as we now witness in both the United States and in Europe. Democracy may face a dangerous three-sided pincer attack, from the Right and Left populist flanks but also from above by increasingly cosmopolitan and dismissive elites who are detached from the travails of the working class.
It is no surprise that the backlash to national governments and distant political elites is being expressed in (anti-) migration politics. Migration and refugee law is the first prominent area in which transnational human rights criteria have circumscribed traditional understandings of sovereignty and citizenship, with an extraordinary role for courts and administrative bodies (not infrequently in opposition to public opinion in Western countries). The postnationalist argument anticipated a growing institutional shift wherein citizenship is increasingly bracketed and even defined in human rights terms, rather than as a mechanism of sovereignty and national self-determination. At the same time, the constituencies driving the human rights architecture, from courts to popular discourse  ̶  among immigrant groups, minorities, various non-governmental organizations, and a new generation less immersed in traditional national ideals  ̶  are equally determined to maintain this more postnational framework.
In the fissures in Western societies around human rights and judicialization, on the one hand, and the democratic, legislative-driven model of the nation-state on the other, we find ourselves betwixt and between and at a fragile moment in our history. It is true that if the state loses its claim to “representativeness, if it loses its control to symbolize its people in believable ways,” in the words of Cynthia Weber (1992: 28), “then [the state] risks losing its source of sovereign authority.” Accordingly, we should not understate the severity of the “crisis of legitimacy” for many Western states in this regard. The English political theoretician Harold Laski (1935: 5) wrote how an “ultimate unity of allegiance”  ̶ meaning the sovereign state vis-à-vis its domestic constituents  ̶ is a “guarantee of order.” In the same vein, Habermas (1992: 16) observed “the social borders of a political community do not just have a functional meaning,” adding that they “regulate rather one’s belonging to a distinct historical community, linked by a common fate and political life form that constitutes the identity of its citizens”.
Yet it is also true that, if the distinction between citizen and foreigner erodes, the connection between state and society frays only if some other form is not broadly accepted in the place of traditional citizenship. For Habermas and many others regarding the “social borders of a political community,” their critiques reflected a normative bias in favor of the nation-state or some form of republicanism, but their critique is built on a self-fulfilling reality, which can imagine such forms of governance as the only logical, legitimate form. Postnationalism dispensed with the notion of the nation-state as singularly based on ideas of national self-determination, but still saw the state as having a key role administratively and institutionally, not least for enforcing human rights domestically and internationally. The nature of membership criteria changed in large measure to universal categories (barring discrimination, for example, based on blood descent), but the state was still confronted by issues of migrant regulation under this new rubric. The issue of membership remained the analytical lens.
Ultimately, we argue that the (counter) linear perspective of change that transnationalism and postnationalism have been “trumped” is based on this singular perspective of membership. Populist approaches are illusions that we can simply role ourselves back to the fully sovereign nation state. This is the same error that aristocratic and monarchic “reactionaries”  ̶  and we for analytical purposes use the term in its technical, not derogatory, sense  ̶ made when they assumed they could undo the effects of the French Revolution to a pre-revolutionary like era. Kings may be temporarily restored, but the past is past. This is not to restate a linear-counter linear view of history, but to note that insofar the “past is present” it is, as we will learn, in a dialectical sense.
Membership is just one of the dimensions characterizing postnational citizenship. Manlio Cinalli’s work is pivotal in developing a comprehensive understanding of citizenship in its epistemological, phenomenological, ontological and teleological dimensions, where the epistemological dimension concerns “membership” (see Cinalli, 2017; in addition, see Cinalli, 2015; Cinalli, 2004 and Cinalli and Giugni, 2016). The strong visibility of this “membership” dimension in the overall scholarly debate that has accompanied postnationalism may have pushed many scholars to rush out to voice that postnationalism is dead, or even stillborn, when in fact postnationalism is reflected across social and political practices and institutions in multifaceted ways. Moreover, a more nuanced and rounded approach to citizenship may provide us a much better lens to emerging trends. Such an approach also will provide a better informed foundation for engaging on normative issues ̶ that is, an approach for more proactively shaping the character of citizenship and a civil future in a fragile world.


2.	Borders and social boundaries

Under postnational citizenship what it means to be a citizen is recast, conditioning notions of national self-determination. This in turn changes the meaning of borders and social boundaries  ̶  not just in a technical sense but in the profound ways borders and social boundaries define the character of the polity, community and identity.
Postnational citizenship changed the nature of borders by making states significantly more accountable than in the past to human rights; recasting nationality from only a mechanism of national self-determination, to nationality as a human right (impacting, inter alia, refugees); dispensing with the notion that we can only have singular loyalties and unleashing a dramatic about-face by almost all democratic states (and beyond) to sanctifying dual citizenship; and empowering the judiciary, including the European Court of Human Rights, on a range of issues to straddle borders (even having universal jurisdiction on gross human rights abuses). In certain circumstances this in turn empowered the language of “diversity” and multiculturalism ̶ that is, internal social boundaries are impacted in tandem with the shift in the form of political borders. 
The public and many scholars tend to understand citizenship  ̶  in all its dimensions  ̶ as an “internal” or domestic issue; when we cross the border we are dealing with “foreigners” or potential migrants and refugees. Even the more recent literature that talks of “borders being everywhere,” of liquid borders, or of migratory controls being diffused beyond the border (or of the migrant as him or herself a “border”), maintains the metaphoric meaning of the border (see for example Rumford, 2012 and Lahav, 2004). In this imaginary, borders have an “inside” and an “outside” ̶  and citizens are most definitely on the inside. 
In fact, we need to understand citizenship as “constitutive” of borders (as well as the more familiar reverse notion), something which is increasingly implied, at least, in the most recent border studies literature (e.g., Rumford, 2012). When viewed in these more nuanced terms, borders can parallel the sociological qualities of citizenship. Borders are a dividing line, but they are also a locus of engagement, constituting communities. Borders can be “top-down,” imposed by the state; or they can be expressive of bottom-up “border-work.” Borders demarcate an external and an internal, or what some may term the self and an other. All these dimensions are reflected in citizenship itself  ̶  from a mechanism of governance to an instrument of the individual; as a means of collective self-determination and identity to a form of exclusion; and in defining an inside and an outside, or in straddling inside and outside. Ultimately citizenship constitutes the borders: citizenship represents the telos, borders the functional instrument.
Much of the literature on borders, while recognizing changes in the proliferation of scales in which the border is encountered and the use of various technologies for border control, are still firmly ensconced in the notion of the sovereign state boundary. Frequently rooted in a normative commitment to open borders and intersecting in part with the concerns of activist groups, the tendency is to see the state as omnipotent in its border work. Many challenge the right of the state to limit entry or membership or rights, especially to those already within or at their borders. We do not address the normative arguments here; rather we consider how the recent border literatures may help understand the underlying political sociological shifts in the border, and how this may implicate citizenship and human rights.
Geographers and critical border scholars have turned to examinations of “borderscapes” rather than borders, emphasizing the shifting variety of spatial practices that work to exclude populations and circumscribe membership (Kofman, 2002; Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2007; Paasi and Prokkola, 2008; Rumford, 2010; Mezzadra and Neilson, 2012; Amilhat Szary and Giraut, 2015; Brambilla, 2015). The “borders are everywhere” framework follows Balibar’s argument along these lines, especially his assertion that entire countries become borders due to the density and spread of border control (Balibar, 1998, also less directly Guild, 2006). For these scholars, borders have become diffused – across multiple scales and across national borders themselves – and they have also become defused – in that the work of states is increasingly outsourced, whether to the International Organization for Migration (Iom) or Frontex, or simply to collaborative agreements that externalize immigration control such as Dublin II or Coutonu (Mountz, 2010; Ashutosh and Mountz, 2011). 
De-territorialization of boundary maintenance occurs especially among countries who are not un Refugee Convention signatories, wherein rules have to be written, not simply outsourced (Dikec, 2009; Andrijavesic, 2010; Ashutosh and Mountz, 2011). Relatedly, the process through which entry and movement and access to rights of membership or even asylum claims is increasingly technocratized in vast biometric databases that build with each attempt at border crossing, whether regional, national, or perhaps local (Rumford, 2006; 2010), as well as with online activity. Bailey (2006) writes of the Finnish and Italian surveillance planes flying over Africa, and of the Italian and Portuguese-sponsored surveillance Frontex boats off the West African coast to detect and try to deter migrants. For Amoore (2006), the diffusion of bordering practices raises a complicated question: what happens when something goes wrong? Who is accountable?
The critical point is that a “shadow state” of migration management extends across borders  ̶ structured and practiced by institutions with none of the traditional obligations of the state (O’Connell-Davidson, 2013; Lewis et al., 2015). From corporate-contract detention centers to facilitating voluntary assisted removals (Ashutosh and Mountz, 2011; Brambilla, 2015), states turn for migration management to international non-governmental organizations like the Iom. Academic critics frame this as a profit-making exercise for the migration managers, and a way for states to extend control while shirking responsibility, all legitimated through the language of human rights.
Most of the critical bordering literature suggests that states appeal to the public through human rights language, while in fact embedding and cementing exclusionary state bordering practices further through outsourcing and spatial dispersion. In processing refugee claims overseas or at sea or on deterritorialized islands like Nauru or Guantanamo, states ensure that refugee claimants stay far from the mainland border – one that maintains control over territorial entry whilst steering clear of non-refoulement principles. Extraterritorial interceptions and offshore detention centers are comprehensive spatial tactics that place migrants far from courts and migrant organizations, and they perpetuate and amplify the invasion crisis discourse of potentially endless desperate hordes arriving by sea or across inhospitable deserts (Darling, 2009; Mountz, 2010; Coleman, 2012; Mainwaring, 2012; DeGenova, 2013; Brambilla, 2015).
These spatial strategies are designed to strip detainees of rights “by geographical design” (Mountz, 2010). Andrijasevic (2010) argues that the eu’s externalization of asylum doesn’t actually relocate asylum proceedings so much as prevent asylum seekers from reaching application procedures (the same is true of the us – see Mountz, Mountz and Hiemstra, 2014), and further that attempts to prevent undocumented migration and smuggling from North Africa illegalize movement and strengthens smuggling networks.
There is a limitation of this normative departure – not that the normative ideals are problematic per se, but that they bias the analysis: the state appears to be omnipotent in controlling its borders, and every technological and organizational step (such as outsourcing) is presented as one more example of increasing power of this octopus-like state. The state is explicitly given the reach of “panopticism” (Martin, 2012). While this can be evident, it limits a deeper understanding of the restructuring of the relationships of states and citizens. That “borders are everywhere” is also reflective of the state’s desperation to maintain control, or an impression of control, in a highly transnational environment – and to address very different constituencies within both the state machinery and society. The critical literature also deemphasizes, or ignores, the massive failures of state control. For example, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 was designed in part to contest subsequent undocumented immigration, at a time when the United States had an estimated 3 million undocumented residents. Yet, by 2008 the undocumented population of the United States grew to an estimated 12 million persons, “despite a five-fold increase in Border Patrol officers, a four- fold increase in hours spent patrolling the border, and a 20-fold increase in nominal funding” (Massey et al., 2016). Literally millions of people breech the state’s regulatory grasp in the United States and in Europe.
However, much of the geographic literature deepens understanding of emerging dynamics of borders and flows over the past few decades. The economic tensions of globalization require both cross-border mobility and the “flexicurity” of easily exploitable labor. Thus geographers have focused on how immigration is capitalism’s “spatial fix,” providing the conditions to reproduce labor power (Peck, 1996; Anderson and Shuttleworth, 2004; Rogaly, 2008). Scott (2013) argues that this is made clear by the United Kingdom’s expansion of strategic workers programs following eu expansion, and the ongoing importation of labor even in regions where native unemployment is high. The challenge is to maintain and encourage movement from both highly-skilled and lower-skilled exploitable migrants – both critical to ensuring the state’s competitiveness under globalization – whilst assuaging domestic concerns over state control of population​[4]​.
The so-called “territorial trap”, following Agnew (1994), is then states’ attempts to create a “purely lawful territory” (Martin, 2012; uses this phrase to describe how detention increasingly signals imminent deportation) when it fact this is never possible. States require transnational or local non-state intermediaries to govern, and to ensure transnational movement whilst precluding membership.
The incomplete and unequal closures of borders are increasingly inevitable because this is in the state’s interest. Sassen (2013: 30) argues that the “transversally closed bordered spaces” that accompany opening national borders yield mobile rights and protections for global elites, although others (including citizens), may become less mobile and may even lose rights (also Collyer, 2009). Minca (2015), citing Gilroy (2004), similarly comments that the bordering practices that decide who belongs and where increasingly hinge on class rather than on race. And at a geopolitical level, the mobility agreements forged between states and conducted by international organizations highlight power inequities inscribed between states as Europe directs rather than cooperates with sending countries eager to gain remittances and greater access to markets (Collyer, 2012; Reslow, 2012). The state, and different agencies within the state, explicitly or implicitly, by design or by default, seek to navigate between both national and transnational forces. This is most notable in the complicated interplay between the pressures of a globalized economy, and the desire for both cheap and professional migrant labor vis-à-vis the concerns of the “losers” in this process (especially the “indigenous” working class), and broader concerns of national identity. 
Postnational challenges to the state thus continue apace, and even hand-in-hand with constraints on asylum claims and the spectacle of detention or deportations. For example, Mainwaring (2015) details the 2010 Massoud v. Malta case, where the European Court of Human Rights (Echr) awarded damages to an Algerian national claiming rights violations regarding detention and deportation practices (2015). Andrijasevic (2010) explains how the Echr and the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (Unhcr) called on Italy to respect rights to international protection and halt deportations to Libya as a non-signatory to Geneva. And although Kofman (2002) generally argues the limits of the postnational argument in that international human rights agreements are not ratified and the jurisdiction of the Echr is narrow, she also allows that these have been used in national courts to prevent expulsions.
Critical scholarly interventions or approaches that stress state oppression or biopolitics tend to overlook the exact role of international human rights law when it comes to border regulation. That law is not about “opening up” borders as such. International human rights instruments change the qualitative basis under which decisions can be made, such as the familiar ban on discriminating against individuals on the basis of their race, gender, social groups, and national origin. In any given slice of time, we will find incidents in which the state – the executive, legislative or judiciary – fails in regard to human rights law. But the real question is to ask how patterns have changed over time? What landmark cases at the national or regional level have changed processes? Such an approach provides for much more robust understanding of developments in the migration area. Over the last three to four decades the changes have been significant, witnessing a real impact of international human rights law in the democratic world. Indeed, the impact has even gone beyond the requirements stipulated in the cold letter of the law, notably in Germany’s en masse acceptance of refugees in 2015.
Unfortunately for many, however, economic criteria  ̶  for example encouraging immigrants with particular educational and economic capital, and opening their pathways to citizenship, is perfectly legitimate under international human rights law. This is creating fractures within and across societies, with the aforementioned class fractures coming to the fore. The professional and middle to upper middle classes benefit from globalization. Domestic working classes usually do not (Nor do economic migrants unless they can make a case for asylum on the basis of the stipulated criteria). Welfare nets have been concomitantly diminished. In a challenge for those of us who are proponents of human rights, international human rights codes have in some sense unintentionally enabled neoliberal policies and enabled the sidetracking of the concerns of the working class.


3.	From Borders to Seams

The border, then, is both the governor and the governed, inside and outside, migrant and citizen. But these dichotomies can also mask certain dialectical processes. For example, the currently popular self-other rubric was seen quite apolitically in the earliest sociological writing (see Cooley, 1902). The distinction was not necessarily expressive of some deeply alienating force, expressed in the popular term “othering.” Rather, self and other were mutually constitutive, and reflected in one another (“the looking glass self”), where your “self” is my “other” and vice-versa. The border can thus also reflect a dialectical process. The border can be both, in this light, a “line” of delineation and of a bringing together, a suturing of networks and communities. Self and Other can be mutually constitutive in a “productive” way for both parties – from business relationships, co-religionists, activists, or criminal gangs. The border as “civilizational” divider creates an alienation between self and other; the border as a suture, a seam, creates a mutual relationship.
In this dialectical context, the border elides into a seam, which sutures together as well as defining a demarcation. Curiously, global seams that mark sharp demarcations – notably the Mediterranean, with its sharp socio-economic, cultural, political and social contrasts--make for “better” seams. Crossing from, say, the Netherlands to Belgium is limited for “productive” relationships – how does one delineate the dialectics of the self of the Dutch from the Flemish other, for example? Seams evolve most emphatically in the space (literal and metaphorical) represented by the following: the developed and developing economies for the flow in products and migrants (and entrepreneurship from peddlers to corporations); ethnic groups in wealthy and politically influential countries to their less well-off brethren (be it political support or remittances); criminal organizations taking advantage of comparative markets’ supply and demand; religious and even fundamentalist organizations offering spiritual succor to those in the West; human rights activists supporting refugees, or women’s groups promoting women’s rights; more broadly the normative sores of political and social discontent between democratic Europe and authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and Africa; or simply the opportunities for “exotic” travel – in all such cases the seam activates, drives, enlivens and provides fuel for the respective cross-national networks and discourse. We trust the reader will understand, in this context, that “productivity” in such cases need not be economic, nor is it necessarily positive from a liberal or humanistic perspective. But global seams are indeed the engines of economic, political, social and cultural innovation and mobilization.
The extraordinary rise of human rights in the last four decades, in the democratic world, helped turn borders into seams, impacting by extension countries in the non-democratic world – not just in state-to-state discourse but in the ebb and flow of social engagement, media and the Internet. Outside of handful of countries, notably in North Korea, it is hard to ignore the digital megaphone on, say, women’s and gay rights.





On both the Right and the Left we see an attempt to roll back the neoliberal globalization of the world, and the associated decline of state obligations to protect and support its citizens. But these developments have to be seen in a context which brings into question the notion that that we have returned to “pre-post-national” citizenship.
A pertinent point, in this context, is this: The state now has the impossible task of creating or implementing its aspired monopoly of ultimate loyalties  ̶  explicit under social and legal concepts of traditional citizenship, undergirded by state sovereignty. Once any citizen belonged to numerous associations--churches, synagogues, schools, places of work, family etc.  ̶ but the state was the citizen’s one guaranteed, legally singular, obligatory association. However, this also meant the state had, in turn, obligations to the citizen  ̶  through, notably, legal protections and welfare support. It is no accident that as state sovereignty declines, so has the state’s obligation to its citizens contracted. This has led, for example, a more restricted view of immigration on the Right but also of some on the Left, for example among some trade unions and even a niche of Marxist scholars (see, for example, Abraham, 2010).
All associations involve networks, with each bounded network closing off (or opening) access to certain form of social, cultural and economic capital and obligations. Our affiliations, whether familial, work, or community, connect us to certain networks, and with these to certain “assets” and responsibilities. All networks have boundaries, or metaphorically a “membrane,” which both binds the group or network, and protects it with varying levels of access. This has always been the case, but the key dimensions in modern life have been the boundary between public and private, inextricably also tied to the institutional bordering of domestic and international. Nation-state borders gained their black-on-white image as the functional and symbolic representation of a purportedly exclusive association, and joined only by invitation  ̶ making citizenship so key to survival in the world (with its right to work and so forth); the state proffered rights and assets that were fundamental to life and obligated the state to the welfare of its citizens. Absent that membership and assurance, one is a refugee, laid bare and vulnerable (Arendt, 1958; Agamben, 1998).
In the Middle Ages, as the historian Joseph Strayer (1970) pointed out, the state represented in the Prince was in contrast distant and largely irrelevant to the daily lives of the peasant. The family and immediate community, instead, was critical for survival. That was the one essential network essential for the individual subject. In the modern world, not having a family may be unpleasant but not a threat to one’s survival as, say, statelessness can be.
Part of the present crisis is that the relative dilution of national citizenship potentially generates an environment without safety nets, or guarantee of ultimate survival (not just economically, but politically, and culturally), because there is a dilution of associations  ̶ like the state and the family  ̶ with a “primordial-like” obligation to the individual​[5]​. In the neoliberal, globalizing world, the trajectory of the individual is left as a remote node in an increasing constellation of networks, afforded different capital and debts. The globalized economy, and the globalizing of social, cultural and political networks of all kinds, also limits the state’s ability to protect its citizens. The relative importance of the welfare state and its social and political protections is diminished. The effect is compounded by populations’ withering support for welfare provisions in response to perceived immigration pressures.
Global seams mediate between the state and an increasingly postnational economic, social, digital, cultural and even political world, but do not account for the question of mutually obligatory associations as those traditional between states and citizens. That leaves the question open as to where, or what could or should be, the critical, “primordial” network today or in the medium future? What can replace the protective net, presently worn away by globalization of all kinds?
The nationalist backlash reflected in Brexit, the election of Trump, and the far right in continental Europe is in part an attempt to reestablish the sovereignty of the state, which is also reflected in significant anti-immigrant, anti-judicial and anti-European Union sentiment. On the Left, the unexpected support for Bernie Sanders in the us in the Democratic primaries in 2016 or the relative success of Jeremy Corbyn in the general elections of 2017 in the uk reflects a desire to reestablish the obligation of the state to its citizenry in terms of, inter alia, generous welfare support. But the structural factors noted here make these attempts palliative at best, not transformational (short of a future, unwelcome, emergence of authoritarian regimes). 
One can argue, that in a vastly more extreme and brutal way, militant Islamist movements like Isis are another form of a backlash, as tribal and patriarchal institutions are heavily stressed by globalizing forces. This is evident not only in sociological data but is explicitly framed as such in the tracts of the ideologists of modern Islamism, notably in Sayyid Qutb’s book “Milestones” (see discussion in Jacobson, 2013). Forces of unimagined thuggery, as well as compassion (in, say, Bernie Sander’s movement), can arise in same the backwash of globalization.
A related problem is that what is considered progressive identity or multicultural politics, is that in practice can, ironically, be a strategy for upward mobility within the cosmopolitan elite. The language of critiques of “white privilege,” or “white male privilege,” is telling – it does not indicate a desire to destroy all privilege in some structural sense. Rather it is often a middle to upper-middle class and professional strategy, across political ideologies, for challenging racial and gender privilege while leaving other forms intact. In practice, those who benefit are most often within the middle class and above. Class privilege is not frontally dismantled, even as concerted efforts are made to dismantle racial and gender hierarchies. It is indeed a neoliberal strategy (Pelabay, 2011); and it is one favoring professional, upper middle class and, to some extent, the middle class. It means that the underlying structural issues – the absence of obligatory associations and networks that cut across social class (once represented in national citizenship, in the Middle Ages in local community, or in tribal societies in clans and kinship) – are reinforced.
Historian David Cannadine (2002) chronicled the “Ornamentalism” of the colonial age, where aristocracies developed cross-national relationships and mutual support, even between the British colonial authorities and Indian caste and princely elites in colonial India. There is a parallel Ornamentalism in the growing horizontal, social, and economic isomorphism of upper middle and professional classes around the world. They share a certain cosmopolitanism, fundamentally disconnected with the tribulations of the working poor. Cosmopolitan and business elites have taken full advantage of the mutually constitutive dialectics of global seams.
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The Future of Postnational Citizenship: Human Rights and Borders in a Re-Nationalizing World
Abstract: Scholarly writing on citizenship of recent decades has frequently led to a reductive understanding of the institution and practice of citizenship  for example, focusing solely on issues of membership. This is equally true in the understanding of the role of human rights vis-à-vis citizenship, notably regarding the concept of postnational citizenship. We examine the concept and practice of postnational citizenship in a period of apparent “re-nationalization”  from Brexit and the election of Trump to the significant gains of far-right parties. Drawing on the work of, inter alia, Manlio Cinalli, we examine a more multidimensional notion of citizenship, beyond issues of membership. We highlight the profound transformations that are taking place, impacting social and political forms of association, networks and in the signification of borders and boundaries. Finally, while observing the continuing key significance of postnational citizenship in driving contemporary developments, we also note fundamental social and economic challenges scholars need to engage for postnational citizenship and human rights to continue to have a robust presence.















^1	 .	By “linear” or “counter-linear” the notion is that social and political change follows a clearly defined path in which we collectively move “forward” or “reverse” along that same path. This linearity is present in the perception that we collectively continue to “globalize” into a single, global economy, rights continue and the like; or we conversely revert towards national sovereignty and a sharply delineated nation-state. Linearity is also inherent in concepts of “progress.”
^2	 .	An example is Plyer v. Doe, in which the Supreme Court ruled, in 1982, that states could not constitutionally deny students a free public education due to immigration status (including undocumented aliens). The court in this case rejected basing the decision on international human rights law and instead turned to the Constitution to buttress its decision. As the preponderance of rights in the Constitution are bestowed upon “persons” as opposed to citizens per se, courts are able to, so to speak, stretch the Constitution to account for non-citizens.
^3	 .	Scholars on postnationalism differ on this point. Soysal (1995) saw multiculturalism as arising out of postnational citizenship, whereas Jacobson (1996) noted the emphasis on individual rights meant that multiculturalism was one form that could emerge but not inherent in postnationalism (see, for example Jacobson, 2013, comparison of France and the United Kingdom).
^4	 .	Paasi and Prokkola (2008) explain Finland’s needs to internationalize its own skilled workers for global competiveness, and that contacts with immigrants and the release from more traditional forms of labor provided by low-skilled immigrant workers are critical. Although this case shows the exigency of these strategies for newer, more peripheral immigrant countries, it also reminds us that this logic has conditioned immigration policies in more traditional immigrant-receiving states
^5	 .	“Primordial” is defined as “from the beginning of time” but is usually understood as a “natural” community, foundational, and even unalterable. We understand these communities are constructed socially like any other community. However, we refer to communities that are felt by its members as their foundational, natural community  ̶  in this case, also their ultimate point of reference, and of existential significance.
